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Abstract
This paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast-based monetary policy
rules which set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a Neo-
Wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects. We show that the presence
of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the Taylor principle to pre-
vent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium, due to a cost channel of
monetary policy. The problem is exacerbated in open economies, particulary if the
policy rule reacts to consumer-price, rather than domestic-price, inflation. However,
we show that determinacy can be achieved in both closed and open economies with
the addition of monetary policy inertia.
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Introduction
The importance of forward-lookingmonetary policy has long been emphasized by researchers.
The need to conduct monetary policy in a forward-looking, or preemptive manner, arises
primarily because of the widely documented long and variable time lag after which a mon-
etary policy action takes effect in the economy (Friedman, 1968). But it has also been
theoretically rationalized on the grounds of central bank credibility, in order to anchor
private-sector expectations (see, e.g., Svensson, 1997; Batini and Haldane, 1999). Such
benefits have not been overlooked by policymakers. Empirical evidence suggests that many
central banks set the nominal interest rate in response to expected future inflation (see,
e.g., Clarida et al., 1998, 2000; Orphanides, 2001, 2004; Mihailov, 2006).
A key issue in the design of such forward-looking monetary policy then, when oper-
ationalized via simple instrument rules, is that the particular interest-rate feedback rule
adopted by a central bank should ensure a determinate equilibrium.1 That is, monetary
policy should be designed to avoid generating indeterminacy which can destabilize the econ-
omy through the emergence of sunspot equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations that result
in large reductions in the welfare of the economy.2 It has been well established in the Neo-
Wicksellian (or New Keynesian) literature that under the Taylor principle, i.e., a policy
that adjusts the nominal interest rate by proportionally more than the increase in inflation,
a central bank can easily prevent the emergence of indeterminacy, provided it is not overly
aggressive in its response to expected future inflation; or alternatively, by also including
contemporaneous output into the feedback rule (see, e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 1997;
Clarida et al., 2000; Woodford, 2003a). These forecast-based interest-rate rules - that also
respond to current output - have additionally been shown to perform well in terms of welfare.
They are a good approximation of the optimal monetary policy for a central bank that has
a quadratic loss function over inflation and output (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999), and for
a broad class of Neo-Wicksellian model economies, their welfare performance is robust (see,
1We focus on simple instrument rules and not on optimal targeting rules. For a discussion on the benefits of
considering simple instrument rules see, e.g., Taylor (1993), Batini and Haldane (1999), Woodford (2001),
Taylor and Williams (2010). See Svensson (2003) for a consideration of optimal targeting rules.
2Our interest is in real indeterminacy rather than nominal indeterminacy. By real indeterminacy we mean
that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths, starting from the same initial conditions, which converge
to the steady state. Our attention rests solely with the consideration of local (real) determinacy as opposed
to global determinacy. For further discussion of these issues see Clarida et al. (2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001), Woodford (2003a), and Cochrane (2011).
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e.g., Taylor and Williams, 2010) and in line with optimal targeting rules (see, e.g., Giannoni
and Woodford, 2005).3 Recent studies have considered whether such interest-rate policies
are also consistent with equilibrium determinacy in open economies.4 This literature has
found that the Taylor principle may not be as effective in preventing indeterminacy in open
economies if the central bank reacts to expected future consumer-price inflation, rather
than expected future domestic-price inflation, since in the former the Taylor principle now
becomes constrained by the economy’s degree of openness to international trade.5 However,
if the policy rule also responds to the real exchange rate, this can help in alleviating the
indeterminacy problem for open economies (see, e.g., Linnemann and Schabert, 2006; Llosa
and Tuesta, 2008; McKnight, 2011a).
A general criticism of the above literature is the notable absence of monetary aggregates
from the determinacy analysis.6 In these studies, the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in a closed economy operates entirely through an aggregate demand channel: changes
in the nominal interest rate affect output via changes in the real interest rate, which results
in a change in inflation via a New Keynesian version of the Phillips curve.7 In this paper
we show that money demand plays a crucial role for equilibrium determination even when
the interest rate is the monetary policy instrument. Indeed, there are strong intuitive
reasons for considering the real balance effects of money and their role in the monetary
transmission mechanism. Since the classical works of Von Haberler (1937), de Scitovszky
(1941), Pigou (1941, 1943), and Patinkin (1949, 1956), it has long been suggested that
changes in real money balances can affect consumption and output through changes in
individual wealth. Another real balance effect of money arises from facilitating transactions
services. As stressed by Woodford (2003a), if money is considered to provide transaction
3Levin et al. (2003) find that instrument rules responding up to a one-year ahead inflation forecast and to
current output are robust to model uncertainty, whereas rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust
and prone to generating indeterminacy.
4See, e.g., Zanna (2003), Batini et al. (2004), De Fiore and Liu (2005), Linnemann and Schabert (2006),
Benigno and Benigno (2008), Llosa and Tuesta (2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2009), Bullard and Schaling
(2009), McKnight (2011a, 2011b).
5This conclusion complements the studies of Clarida et al. (2002) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) who show
that an instrument rule that responds to domestic-price inflation welfare dominates a similar rule that
reacts to consumer-price inflation. However, Benigno and Benigno (2006) derive the conditions under which
consumer-price inflation can be a component of the optimal targeting rule under international monetary
policy cooperation.
6These studies either assume a cashless economy or adopt a money-in-the-utility function model with sepa-
rability between real money balances and other arguments.
7In the open economy there is an additional monetary transmission channel that arises through changes in
the terms of trade. Now changes in the nominal interest rate also affect output (and thus inflation) via an
expenditure switching effect towards/away from foreign goods.
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services then the benefits of this service should be related to the individual’s volume of
transactions. Empirical estimates suggest that such effects, while small, are found to exist
in the data.8
While there is a large literature that explores the determinacy properties of interest-rate
rules, our contribution is to consider the robustness of the Taylor principle in closed and open
economies when real balance effects of transactions services are explicitly modeled. Similar
to Woodford (2003a) and Kurozumi (2006), these effects are introduced via money-in-the-
utility-function (MIUF) where consumption and real money balances enter non-separably.9
Now there is an additional monetary transmission mechanism, a cost channel, where changes
in the nominal interest rate result in changes in the demand for money, which affects the
output and pricing decisions of firms, via changes in the real marginal cost of production.
The analysis therefore examines whether empirically plausible real balance effects can have
important implications for determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium in both
closed and open economies. We begin by showing that, for closed economies, the presence
of real balance effects increases the severity of indeterminacy under the Taylor principle.
This is first demonstrated for feedback rules that set the nominal interest rate in response
solely to expected future inflation (strict inflation targeting), and then shown to be robust
when contemporaneous, or future output is also incorporated into the feedback rule (flexible
inflation targeting). Next, we investigate the determinacy implications of real balance
effects for open economies, where the feedback rule can respond to either domestic-price
or consumer-price inflation. Consistent with the empirical studies of Clarida et al. (1998,
2000), Orphanides (2004) and Mihailov (2006), we focus our attention on a feedback rule
that reacts to expected future inflation and contemporaneous output. In general, we find
that in the presence of real balance effects the problem of indeterminacy is more severe
for open economies than closed economies. When the indicator of inflation used in the
policy rule is domestic-price inflation, we find that the cost channel of monetary policy
increases the range of indeterminacy as the degree of trade openness decreases. However,
by reacting to consumer-price inflation, not only does the range of indeterminacy increase
sizeably - relative to reacting to domestic-price inflation - but the range of indeterminacy is
8See, e.g., Woodford (2003a) and Ireland (2004) using US data, Andre´s et al. (2006) using Euro-area data,
and Kremer et al. (2003) using German data.
9Alternatively, Andre´s et al. (2009) generate real balance effects through the introduction of portfolio
adjustment costs (in terms of real money balances).
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now increasing with respect to the degree of trade openness. Moreover, reacting also to the
real exchange rate cannot alleviate the indeterminacy problem associated with real balance
effects. Instead, we show that for both closed and open economies policy inertia can help
mitigate the indeterminacy problem either in the form of interest-rate smoothing or under
a speed-limit feedback rule, as originally proposed by Walsh (2003).
The current paper is related to the literature that has been studying the implications for
equilibrium determinacy in closed economies when the real balance effects of transactions
services are introduced through the assumption of non-separability of the utility function
(between consumption and real money balances). Under a contemporaneous inflation pol-
icy rule specification, Schabert and Stoltenberg (2005) and Kurozumi (2006) employing a
discrete-time MIUF model, and Benhabib et al. (2001) employing a continuous-time MIUF
model, all find that real balance effects have no implications for determinacy of the rational
expectations equilibrium. However, Kurozumi (2006) shows that real balance effects can
be destabilizing if the policy rule responds, in addition to current inflation, also to current
output.10,11 Our paper’s contribution to the existing literature is twofold. Previous stud-
ies have focused exclusively on the determinacy implications of real balance effects under
contemporaneous interest-rate rules. Therefore, the first contribution of this paper is that
it fills an important gap in the literature by examining the determinacy implications of
real balance effects under a variety of forecast-based, empirically motivated feedback rules
that should be of interest to policymakers. We show that the indeterminacy implications
of real balance effects are more severe when interest rate policy is forward-looking rather
than contemporaneous-looking. When policy is forward-looking, self-fulfilling inflation ex-
pectations can arise, via a cost channel of monetary policy, if the monetary authority is
overly-aggressive in responding to expected future inflation. The more flexible are prices
in the economy the narrower is the policymaker’s range of response to expected future in-
flation that can avoid indeterminacy. Secondly, under the cost channel adding a response
to output in the policy rule weakens the magnitude of the response of the nominal interest
rate to anticipated future inflation. Therefore, the lower bound on the inflation response
10Kurozumi (2006) also highlights that transaction frictions can play an important role in inducing indeter-
minacy. By extending the analysis of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) to allow for real balance effects, he shows
that different timing assumptions on how money balances enter the utility function can alter the conditions
for determinacy. A similar point is also made by Schabert and Stoltenberg (2005) and Stoltenberg (2012).
11For a similar feedback rule, Piergallini (2006) finds that when consumers are assumed to be finite-lived then
real balance effects could actually have a stabilizing effect on the rational expectations equilibrium.
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coefficient needs to be greater than the Taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy.
The second contribution of this paper is that we also consider the determinacy impli-
cations of real balance effects for open economies. This is a highly significant issue in the
design of interest rate policy, given the large and increasing trade share of many inflation-
targeting countries (De Fiore and Liu, 2005).12 Our results suggest that open economies are
particularly prone to indeterminacy with real balance effects when the central bank targets
consumer-price inflation in the conduct of forecast-based monetary policy. This is important
since, as discussed by Hammond (2012), all 27 inflation-targeting central banks currently
use a headline consumer-price inflation measure as their operational target. Furthermore,
in the presence of real balance effects the solution to alleviating the indeterminacy problem
lies not with policy responding to the exchange rate, but rather with the need for policy
inertia. Consequently, the remedies for restoring equilibrium determinacy under the Taylor
principle are the same for both closed and open economies alike. It is shown that both a
speed-limit rule that features a response to observed output growth or a policy of interest
rate smoothing can help ameliorate the indeterminacy problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and
Section 3 discusses the linearized equilibrium system. The determinacy analysis for closed
economies is addressed in Section 4. Section 5 derives the conditions for determinacy in an
open-economy context and proposes an amendment to the feedback rules studied earlier,
which eliminates the identified indeterminacy problem. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
The model is a two-country extension of the Neo-Wicksellian MIUF model employed by
Woodford (2003a) and Kurozumi (2006) for the closed economy. Within each country there
exists a representative infinitely-lived household, a representative final-good producer, a
continuum of intermediate-goods producing firms, and a monetary authority. Real balance
effects are introduced by assuming that the utility function of the representative household
is non-separable between consumption and real money balances. The representative final-
12De Fiore and Liu (2005) study the determinacy implications of feedback rules for small open economies in the
presence of transactions frictions represented by a cash-in-advance constraint. However, in stark contrast to
this analysis, they do not consider the role of transactions services, the importance of domestic-price versus
consumer-price inflation, nor the role of an output policy response in the feedback rule.
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good producer is a competitive firm that bundles domestic and imported intermediate goods
into non-tradeable final goods. Intermediate-goods firms operate under monopolistic com-
petition and set prices in a staggered fashion according to Calvo (1983). Monetary policy
is governed by a Taylor-type rule where the nominal interest rate reacts to expected future
inflation. In line with the recent determinacy literature, we assume that the law of one price
holds, financial markets are complete, and that the degree of trade openness is proxied by
the inverse of home bias in preferences for traded inputs.13 Preferences and technologies
are symmetric across the two countries. We present the features of the model for the home
country on the understanding that the foreign case can be analogously derived, where an
asterisk denotes foreign variables.
1.1 Final-Goods Sector
The home final good (Z) is produced by a competitive firm that uses domestic (ZH) and
imported (ZF ) intermediate goods as inputs according to the aggregation technology index:
Zt =
[
a
1
θZ
θ−1
θ
H,t + (1 − a)
1
θZ
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
, (1)
ZH,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
zH,t(i)
ϕ−1
ϕ di
] ϕ
ϕ−1
, ZF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
zF,t(j)
ϕ−1
ϕ dj
] ϕ
ϕ−1
, (2)
where zH(i) and zF (j) are the respective quantities of the domestic and imported type i and
j intermediate goods. The parameter θ > 0 represents the constant elasticity of substitution
between aggregate home and foreign intermediate goods, 0.5 < a < 1 captures the degree of
home bias towards domestic intermediate goods, and ϕ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
across individual home (foreign) intermediate goods.
Let pH(i) and pF (j) represent the respective prices of zH(i) and zF (j) in home currency.
Cost minimization in final good production yields the aggregate demand conditions for home
and foreign goods:
ZH,t = a
(
PH,t
Pt
)
−θ
Zt, ZF,t = (1− a)
(
PF,t
Pt
)
−θ
Zt, (3)
13Recent empirical studies find evidence that international financial markets are incomplete and the law of
one price assumption is rejected by the data (see, e.g., Rabanal and Tuesta, 2010). However, for analytical
tractability and comparative purposes we adopt the standard assumptions of the existing determinacy
literature.
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where the demand for individual goods is given by
zH,t(i) =
(
pH,t(i)
PH,t
)
−ϕ
ZH,t, zF,t(j) =
(
pF,t(j)
PF,t
)
−ϕ
ZF,t. (4)
Since the final-good producer is competitive, its price is equal to marginal cost:
Pt =
[
aP 1−θH,t + (1− a)P
1−θ
F,t
] 1
1−θ
, (5)
where P is the consumer price index and PH and PF are the respective price indices of
home and foreign intermediate goods, all denominated in home currency
PH,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
pH,t(i)
1−ϕdi
] 1
1−ϕ
, PF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
pF,t(j)
1−ϕdj
] 1
1−ϕ
. (6)
We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one
price holds, which implies that
PH,t = StP
∗
H,t, P
∗
F,t =
PF,t
St
, (7)
where S is the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q ≡ SP
∗
P
denote the real exchange rate,
under the law of one price the CPI index (5) and its foreign equivalent imply:
(
1
Qt
)1−θ
=
(
Pt
StP ∗t
)1−θ
=
aP 1−θH,t + (1− a)
(
StP
∗
F,t
)1−θ
a
(
StP ∗F,t
)1−θ
+ (1− a)P 1−θH,t
. (8)
Hence, with home bias between intermediate goods (i.e. a > 0.5), the purchasing power
parity (PPP) condition fails to hold. The relative price of foreign goods in terms of home
goods, or the (home) terms of trade T , is defined as:
T ≡
SP ∗F
PH
. (9)
8
1.2 Intermediate-Goods Sector
Intermediate-sector firms hire labor h to produce output given a real wage rate w. A firm
of type i has a linear production technology
yt(i) = ht(i), (10)
and given competitive prices of labor, cost minimization yields
mct = wt
Pt
PH,t
, (11)
where mc ≡ MC
PH
is real marginal cost. Intermediate-sector firms set prices according to
Calvo (1983), where in each period there is a constant probability 1 − ψ that a firm will
be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn independently of past history. A
domestic firm i, faced with changing its price at time t, has to choose pH,t(i) to maximize
its expected discounted value of profits, taking as given the indexes P , PH , PF , Z, and Z
∗:
max
pH,t(i)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βψ)sXt,t+s
{
[pH,t(i)−MCt+s]
[
zH,t+s(i) + z
∗
H,t+s(i)
]}
, (12)
where
zH,t+s(i) + z
∗
H,t+s(i) ≡
(
pH,t(i)
PH,t+s
)
−ϕ
[ZH,t+s + Z
∗
H,t+s],
and the firm’s stochastic discount factor used to value random date t+s payoffs is βsXt,t+s =
βs[UC(Ct+s,mt+s)/UC(Ct,mt)](Pt/Pt+s). It follows that the optimal price-setting decision
is given by:
pH,t(i) =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
Et
∑
∞
s=0(βψ)
sXt,t+sP
ϕ
H,t+s
(
ZH,t+s + Z
∗
H,t+s
)
MCt+s
Et
∑
∞
s=0(βψ)
sXt,t+sP
ϕ
H,t+s
(
ZH,t+s + Z∗H,t+s
) , (13)
where the optimal price set is a mark-up ϕ
ϕ−1 over a weighted average of expected future
nominal marginal costs.
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1.3 Representative Household
The representative household chooses real consumption C, domestic real money balances
m ≡M/P , and labor h to maximize expected discounted utility:14
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, ht
)
,
where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint
Et{Γt,t+1Bt+1}+Mt + PtCt ≤ Bt +Mt−1 + Ptwtht +
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)d(i) + Υt. (14)
The household carries Mt−1 units of money and Bt units of nominal bonds into period t.
Before proceeding to the goods market, the household visits the financial market where
a state-contingent nominal bond Bt+1 can be purchased that pays one unit of domestic
currency in period t + 1 if a specific state is realized at a period t price Γt,t+1. During
period t the household supplies labor to the intermediate-sector firms receiving real income
from wages wt, nominal profits from the ownership of domestic intermediate-sector firms
Πt, and a lump-sum (net) nominal transfer Υt from the monetary authority. The household
then uses these resources to purchase the final good.
The period utility function is assumed to be non-separable between consumption and
real money balances but additively separable with respect to labor:15
U (C,m, h) ≡ u (Ct,mt)− v (ht) . (15)
The first-order conditions from the home household’s maximization problem yield:
βEt
{
uc (Ct+1,mt+1)
Pt+1
}
=
uc (Ct,mt)
Pt
1
Rt
(16)
um (Ct,mt)
uc (Ct,mt)
=
Rt − 1
Rt
(17)
14To facilitate comparison with the vast majority of the existing literature, we adopt the traditional conven-
tion that end-of-period real money balances enter the utility function. Assuming an alternative timing-
assumption on money could have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy, as discussed by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), Kurozumi (2006), McKnight(2011b), and Stoltenberg (2012).
15As is standard, we assume that u(C,m) is concave and strictly increasing in each argument and both
consumption and real money balances are normal goods. It is further assumed that v(h), the disutility of
labor supply, is an increasing, convex function.
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vh (ht)
uc (Ct,mt)
= wt (18)
where Rt denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond defined as R
−1
t ≡
Et{Γt,t+1}. Equation (16) is the consumption Euler equation, (17) defines the money
demand function, and (18) determines labor supply. Optimizing behavior further implies
that the budget constraint (14) holds with equality in each period and the appropriate
transversality condition is satisfied. Analogous conditions apply to the foreign household.
Letting (R∗t )
−1 ≡ Et{Γt,t+1
St+1
St
} denote the price of the state-contingent bond denom-
inated in foreign currency, then no-arbitrage implies the following uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) condition:
RtEt {Γt,t+1} = R
∗
tEt
{
Γt,t+1
St+1
St
}
. (19)
Finally, combining equation (16) with its foreign equivalent, and using the definition of the
real exchange rate, the following international risk sharing condition can be obtained:
Qt = q0
uc∗(C
∗
t ,m
∗
t )
uc(Ct,mt)
, (20)
which follows from the assumption of complete asset markets, where the constant q0 ≡
Q0
[
uc(C0,m0)
uc∗ (C
∗
0
,m∗
0
)
]
.
1.4 Monetary Authority
Monetary policy is specified as a Taylor-type rule in which the nominal interest rate is a
function of expected future inflation and current or expected future output:
Rt = R
(
Et{pi
H
t+1}
piH
)µpi (
Et{Yt+k}
Y
)µy
, Rt = R
(
Et{pit+1}
pi
)µpi (Et{Yt+k}
Y
)µy
, (21)
where µpi, µy ≥ 0, k = 0, 1, andR, Y , pi
H , and pi respectively denote the steady state nominal
interest rate, output, and the domestic-price, or consumer-price, inflation rate. As discussed
by Hammond (2012), the vast majority of inflation-targeting central banks currently use
headline consumer-price inflation as their operational target. However, Clarida et al. (2002)
and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) show that there are potential welfare gains from switching to
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domestic-price inflation. Hence, we consider two-versions of the Taylor rule in (21), where
the monetary authority can adjust the (gross) nominal interest rate in response to expected
changes in domestic-price inflation piH or in consumer-price inflation pi.
Our motivation for adopting forecast-based interest rate rules of the form (21) is two-
fold. First, there is evidence to suggest that real economic activity is used to help forecast
expected future inflation. In particular, the empirical studies of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000),
Orphanides (2004), and Mihailov (2006), all find evidence that current output is used in the
conduct of monetary policy for Germany, Japan, US, and UK. Second, Taylor rules of the
form (21) have been shown to perform well in terms of welfare and are robust to a variety
of modeling assumptions.16 For example, as shown by Clarida et al. (1999), a forecast-
based interest rate rule that also responds to current output is a good approximation of the
optimal policy rule for a central bank that has a quadratic loss function over inflation and
output.
1.5 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The home aggregate output index is defined as: Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(i)di. Market clearing for home
intermediate-goods requires
yt(i) = zH,t(i) + z
∗
H,t(i) =
(
pH,t(i)
PH,t
)
−ϕ
[ZH,t + Z
∗
H,t],
for each firm i. Inserting the above condition into the definition of home aggregate output
yields:
Yt =
[
ZH,t + Z
∗
H,t
] ∫ 1
0
(
pH,t(i)
PH,t
)
−ϕ
. (22)
Total home demand must equal the supply of the final good
Zt = Ct, (23)
and the labor market, the money market
Υt =Mt −Mt−1, (24)
16See Taylor and Williams (2010) for an excellent summary of the literature.
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and the bond market all clear
Bt +B
∗
t = 0. (25)
Definition 1 (Rational-Expectations Equilibrium): Given an initial allocation of Bt0 , B
∗
t0
,
and Mt0−1, M
∗
t0−1, a rational-expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {Ct, C
∗
t , Mt,
M∗t , ht, h
∗
t , Bt, B
∗
t , Rt, R
∗
t , Γt, Γ
∗
t , MCt, MC
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , Yt, Y
∗
t , St, Qt, Pt, P
∗
t , PH,t,
P ∗H,t, PF,t, P
∗
F,t, Zt, Z
∗
t , ZH,t, ZF,t, Z
∗
H,t, Z
∗
F,t} for all t ≥ t0 characterized by: (i) the
optimality conditions of the representative household, (16) to (18), the budget constraint
(14) is satisfied and the transversality condition holds; (ii) cost-minimization (11) and
price-setting behavior of intermediate-sector firms (13), and the aggregate version of the
production function (10); (iii) the final good producer’s optimality conditions, (3) and (5);
(iv) all markets clear, (22) to (25); (v) the monetary policy rule is satisfied (21); along with
the foreign counterparts for (i)-(v) and conditions (7), (8), (19), and (20).
2 Local Equilibrium Dynamics
2.1 Linearized Model
As is common in the literature, the model is log-linearized around a zero-inflation symmetric
steady state. In what follows, all hatted variables denote percentage deviations from the
steady state. Linearizing (16) yields the IS equation for the home country:
Ĉt = EtĈt+1 − σ
[
R̂t − Etpit+1 + χ (Etm̂t+1 − m̂t)
]
, (26)
where σ ≡ −uc/uccC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
and χ ≡ mucm/uc is the degree of non-separability between consumption and real money
balances. For analytical tractability, the ensuing analysis follows Kurozumi (2006) in im-
posing:
Assumption 1 0 ≤ χ < (ηcσ)
−1 ⇔ 0 ≤ 1− ηcσχ ≡ Ω < 1,
which, as discussed in Section 3.2 below, is of most empirical relevance.
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Linearizing the price-setting equation (13) and using (6) yields the AS equation, or New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), for the home country:
piHt = βEtpi
H
t+1 + λm̂ct, (27)
where λ ≡ (1−ψ)(1−βψ)
ψ
> 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of inflation and real marginal
cost is given by:
m̂ct = ωŶt +
1
σ
Ĉt − χm̂t + (1− a)T̂t, (28)
after combining the linearized versions of (5), (7), (9), (10), (11), and (18), where ω ≡
hvhh/vh > 0 is the output elasticity of real marginal cost. Domestic output follows from
the linearized versions of (3), (5), their foreign equivalents, (7), (9), and the market clearing
conditions (22) and (23):
Ŷt = 2aθ(1− a)T̂t + aĈt + (1− a)Ĉ
∗
t . (29)
Linearizing equation (17) yields the LM equation
m̂t = ηcĈt − ηRR̂t, (30)
where ηc, ηR > 0 are the consumption elasticity and interest rate semi-elasticity of money
demand, which are defined as follows:
ηc ≡
σ−1 + ϑ
χ+ σ−1m
, ηR ≡
(
β
1− β
)(
1
χ+ σ−1m
)
,
where σ−1m ≡ −mumm/um, ϑ ≡ Cumc/um, and χ = smϑ, where sm ≡ mum/ucC, with all
partial derivatives evaluated at the steady state.
Linearizing equations (7), (8), (9), (19), and (20) yields expressions for the UIP condi-
tion, the terms of trade, and the consumer-price inflation differential:
R̂t − R̂
∗
t = Et∆Ŝt+1 (31)
(2a− 1)T̂t = σ
−1
(
Ĉt − Ĉ
∗
t
)
− χ (m̂t − m̂
∗
t ) (32)
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pit − pi
∗
t = (2a− 1)
(
piHt − pi
∗F
t
)
+ 2(1− a)∆Ŝt (33)
where Et∆Ŝt+1 ≡ EtŜt+1 − Ŝt is the expected depreciation of the home currency from t
to t + 1. Note that an important consequence of assuming non-separability of the utility
function is that real money balances enter the IS equation (26), the AS equation (27), and
the terms of trade condition (32).
The linearized equilibrium system is given by equations (26)-(30), their foreign equiva-
lents, and equations (31)-(33), along with linearized versions of the interest rate rule (21):
R̂t = µpiEtpi
H
t+1 + µyEtŶt+k; or R̂t = µpiEtpit+1 + µyEtŶt+k; (34)
and their foreign equivalents, where µpi is the inflation response coefficient and µy is the
output response coefficient.
It is important to stress that in the above system there are three channels of monetary
policy transmission. Using (28) and (29) to eliminate m̂ct and Ŷt from (27) and combining
this AS equation with its foreign equivalent and the terms of trade condition (32) generates
the following expression for the domestic-price inflation differential (in deviations from the
steady state):
piHt − pi
∗F
t = βEt
(
piHt+1 − pi
∗F
t+1
)
+ [κC + κT ζC ]
(
Ĉt − Ĉ
∗
t
)
− [κµ + κT ζµ] (m̂t − m̂
∗
t ) , (35)
where κT ≡ 2λ(1− a)[1 + 2aωθ] > 0, κC ≡ λ[ω(2a− 1) + 1/σ] > 0, ζC ≡ [σ(2a− 1)]
−1 > 0,
κµ ≡ λχ > 0, and ζµ ≡ χ/(2a−1) > 0. There is the conventional aggregate demand channel,
where a relative increase in the home country’s interest rate lowers home consumption and
reduces the domestic-price inflation differential, the sensitivity of which depends on the
coefficient κC . A second transmission channel of monetary policy operates via the demand
for money, which affects the cost of production of intermediate-sector firms. With real
balance effects, the differential demand for money enters into (35) as a negative cost-push
shock. Here an increase in the relative interest rate generates a relative reduction in the
demand for domestic money, which results in an increase in real marginal cost and, given the
coefficient κµ, an increase in the domestic-price inflation differential. Finally, there is a terms
of trade channel, where a relative increase in the interest rate leads to an improvement in
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Table 1: Linearized system of equations
Aggregate System
EtĈ
W
t+1 = Ĉ
W
t + σR̂
W
t − σEtpi
W
t+1 + σχEtm̂
W
t+1 − σχm̂
W
t IS
W
m̂Wt = ηcĈ
W
t − ηRR̂
W
t LM
W
piWt = βEtpi
W
t+1 + λωŶ
W
t +
λ
σ
ĈWt − λχm̂
W
t AS
W
ŶWt = Ĉ
W
t Output
W
R̂Wt = µpiEtpi
W
t+1 + µyEtŶ
W
t+k Taylor rule
W
Difference System
EtĈ
R
t+1 = Ĉ
R
t + σR̂
R
t − σEtpi
R
t+1 + σχEtm̂
R
t+1 − σχm̂
R
t IS
R
m̂Rt = ηcĈ
R
t − ηRR̂
R
t LM
R
pi
R(H−F∗)
t = βEtpi
R(H−F∗)
t+1 + 2λ(1− a)T̂t +
λ
σ
ĈRt
− λχm̂Rt + λωŶ
R
t AS
R
Ŷ Rt = 4aθ(1− a)T̂t + (2a− 1)Ĉ
R
t Output
R
R̂Rt = ∆EtŜt+1 UIP
(2a− 1)T̂t =
1
σ
ĈRt − χm̂
R
t ToT
piRt = (2a− 1)pi
R(H−F∗)
t + 2(1− a)∆Ŝt Inflation
R
R̂Rt = µpiEtpi
R(H−F∗)
t+1 + µyEtŶ
R
t+k Taylor rule
R: PPI
R̂Rt = µpiEtpi
R
t+1 + µyEtŶ
R
t+k Taylor rule
R: CPI
Notes: The index W refers to world aggregates where piW = pi+pi
∗
2
= pi
H+pi∗F
2
. The
index R refers to the difference between home and foreign variables e.g., pi
R(H−F∗)
t
≡(
pi
H
t − pi
∗F
t
)
.
the terms of trade, which has two separate effects on the domestic-price inflation differential.
On the one hand, an improvement in the terms of trade, via an expenditure switching effect
to foreign intermediate-sector goods, reduces the domestic-price inflation differential to an
extent determined by κT ζC , whereas on the other hand, it increases the inflation differential
(because of real balance effects) through relative changes in real marginal cost depending
on κT ζµ.
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Since we are interested in obtaining analytical conditions for determinacy under both the
closed and open economy dimensions of the model, it will be convenient to use the method of
Aoki (1981) to split the linearized equilibrium system into two decoupled dynamic systems:
the aggregate system that captures the properties of the closed world economy and the
difference system that portrays the open-economy dimension. This decomposition of the
linearized model into worldwide aggregates XW ≡ X̂2 +
X̂∗
2 and cross-country differences
17Clearly, in a closed economy both these terms of trade effects are absent since κT = 0 as a = 1.
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Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 6.4
ω Output elasticity of (real) marginal cost 0.47
ψ Degree of price stickiness 0.5 or 0.75
χ Degree of non-separability of utility function 0 ≤ χ ≤ 0.03
ηc Consumption elasticity of money demand 1
ηR Interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand 28
θ Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 1
1− a Degree of trade openness 0.15 or 0.4
XR ≡ X̂−X̂∗ is summarized in Table 1. The determinacy properties of the closed-economy
dimension of the model are fully characterized by the aggregate system.18 However, for the
equilibrium to be determinate in the open economy it must be the case that there is a
unique solution for both cross-country differences and world aggregates.19
2.2 Parameterization
It will be useful to illustrate our results using the benchmark values for the parameters
specified in Table 2. Parameter β is standard in the literature and ω is taken from Woodford
(2003a). Consistent with the empirical estimates of Mankiw and Summers (1986), we set
the consumption elasticity of money demand ηc = 1. Following Woodford (2003a) and
Kurozumi (2006), we set the interest-rate semi-elasticity of money demand ηR = 28 and
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption σ = 6.4. The latter is consistent
with Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1997) estimate of σ = 6.37 for the US economy and
implies a value of the risk aversion coefficient of 1/σ ≈ 0.16.20 Consistent with recent
empirical estimates by Woodford (2003a), Ireland (2004), and Andre´s et al. (2006), we only
consider values for the degree of non-separability 0 ≤ χ ≤ 0.03.21 As noted by Benhabib
18Note that the measure of inflation targeted in the interest-rate feedback rule is irrelevant in the aggregate
system, since in a closed economy domestic and consumer-price inflation are identical concepts, i.e., piW =
pi+pi∗
2
= pi
H+pi∗F
2
.
19Determinacy of the aggregate and difference systems implies determinacy at the individual country level
since X̂ = XW + X
R
2
and X̂∗ = XW − X
R
2
.
20Woodford (2003a) argues that a low risk aversion coefficient is justified on the grounds that the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity of consumption is significantly higher once investment in capital and consumer
durables are considered.
21These values for χ satisfy Assumption 1.
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and Eusepi (2005) and Huang et al. (2009), empirical estimates of ψ vary considerably. We
set ψ = 0.50, 0.75, which imply that prices are fixed on average for two, and four, quarters
respectively. Consistent with Bergin (2006), we set θ = 1. Finally, for illustrative purposes,
two alternative values for the degree of trade openness are also chosen, which are roughly
consistent with the ratio of imports to GDP of the USA (a = 0.85) and Canada (a = 0.6).
3 Determinacy Analysis for the Closed Economy
This section considers the issue of local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium
for the closed economy.
3.1 Policy Response to Expected Future Inflation
We first consider the determinacy implications for an interest-rate feedback rule that re-
sponds only to expected future inflation (i.e. µy = 0 in (34)).
Proposition 1 If the policy rule reacts only to expected future inflation, then given As-
sumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy in a
closed economy are:
1 < µpi < min{Γ
1
1,Γ
1
3} or max{1,Γ
1
1} < µpi < min{Γ
1
2,Γ
1
3} (36)
where
Γ11 ≡
βΩ
ηRλωσχ
; Γ12 ≡
Ω(1 + β)
ηRλωσχ
; Γ13 ≡
2Ω(1 + β) + λ (Ω + σω)
λ [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that with separability of the utility function (i.e. χ = 0) the bounds Γ11 and Γ
1
2 no
longer apply, while Γ13 reduces to Γ
1
3,χ=0 = 1+
2(1+β)
λ(1+σω) . Hence, the determinacy conditions
summarized in Proposition 1 collapse to:
1 < µpi < 1 +
2(1 + β)
λ(1 + σω)
. (37)
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Figure 1: Determinacy region under a strict forecast-based inflation rule
It is clear from (36) and (37) that while the Taylor principle (i.e. µpi > 1) is a necessary
condition for equilibrium determinacy, it is not sufficient. The numerical analysis suggests
that, with very small, empirically plausible values for χ, real balance effects play a signif-
icant role in reducing the upper bound on the inflation response coefficient µpi. Using the
parameter values summarized in Table 2, Figure 1 illustrates the regions of determinacy
and indeterminacy for combinations of µpi and the degree of price rigidity ψ for alternative
values of χ = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03. The top, left-hand corner of Fig. 1 shows the determinacy
properties of the model under separability of the utility function. In this case, the Tay-
lor principle easily induces determinacy of equilibrium. The other three panels of Fig. 1
show the indeterminacy implications of real balance effects as χ is increased. It is evident
from Fig. 1 that real balance effects exert a destabilizing effect on the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. By inspection, the upper bound on µpi is tighter, the higher the degree
of non-separability, and the lower the degree of price stickiness. Consequently, the Taylor
principle is now weakened in its effectiveness in preventing indeterminacy. For example,
setting χ = 0.03, then the interval of inflation response coefficients that induce determinacy
is only 1 < µpi < 1.15 with ψ = 0.50.
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Existing studies (e.g., Kurozumi, 2006) have found that real balance effects have no
implications for determinacy when the interest-rate feedback rule responds only to contem-
poraneous inflation. Therefore, why do real balance effects play a significant role for equilib-
rium determination when the interest-rate rule reacts to expected future inflation? For some
intuition, first note that the relevance of real money balances arises because changes in the
nominal interest rate influence real marginal cost: m̂c
W
t = [ω + 1/σ − χηc] Ĉ
W
t + χηRR̂
W
t .
Following an increase in expected future inflation, ↑ Et{pi
W
t+1}, the monetary authority
responds under the Taylor principle by raising the nominal and real interest rate. The in-
crease in the nominal interest rate exerts upward pressure on m̂cWt via the cost channel of
monetary policy, whereas the corresponding rise in the real interest rate exerts downward
pressure on m̂cWt by reducing current consumption via the aggregate demand channel of
monetary policy. If the cost channel is sufficiently strong then real marginal cost can rise
and the initial increase in inflationary expectations can be self-fulfilling. When policy is
forward-looking, R̂Wt = µpiEt{pi
W
t+1}, then the NKPC (27) for the closed economy can be
expressed as:
piWt = [β + λχηRµpi ]Et{pi
W
t+1}+ λ [ω + 1/σ − χηc] Ĉ
W
t .
For the initial increase in inflation expectations to be self-fulfilling requires: ↑ pit >↑
Et{pit+1}. This is more likely, the larger is χ, λ (i.e. the lower is ψ), and µpi.
22 However,
under a contemporaneous feedback policy rule, R̂Wt = µpipi
W
t , then the NKPC becomes:
piWt =
β
1− λχηRµpi
Et{pi
W
t+1}+
λ [ω + 1/σ − χηc]
1− λχηRµpi
ĈWt .
By changing the parameter triplets (χ, λ, µpi) the cost channel of monetary policy cannot
be strengthened without also strengthening the aggregate demand channel. Consequently,
inflationary expectations cannot be made self-fulfilling and indeterminacy is not possible
under the Taylor principle.23
22This cost channel is absent in models that ignore real balance effects (χ = 0). As illustrated in Fig. 1, a
significantly higher parameter pair (µpi , λ) is consequently required to induce indeterminacy.
23In this case indeterminacy can only arise, through the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy, if the
central bank follows a passive policy response, µpi < 1.
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3.2 Policy Response to Output
We now consider the determinacy implications for the closed economy if output is also
included in the interest-rate feedback rule. Proposition 2 derives the determinacy conditions
when the feedback rule responds to contemporaneous output (i.e. k = 0 in (34)) and
Proposition 3 when expected future output enters the interest rate rule (i.e. k = 1 in (34)).
3.2.1 Policy Response to Expected Future Inflation and Contemporaneous
Output
We first examine the policy response to contemporaneous output. As previously discussed,
this rule explains well how monetary policy is conducted for a number of countries.
Proposition 2 If the policy rule reacts to expected future inflation and contemporaneous
output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium
determinacy in a closed economy are:
max{0,Γ21} < µpi < min{Γ
2
3,Γ
2
4} or max{0,Γ
2
1,Γ
2
3} < µpi < min{Γ
2
2,Γ
2
4} (38)
where Γ2i , i = 2, 3, 4, are given in Appendix B, and
Γ21 ≡ 1−
σ (1− β − ληRχ)
λ(Ω + σω)
µy.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that with χ = 0 the bounds Γ21 and Γ
2
2 no longer apply and the determinacy conditions
summarized in Proposition 2 collapse to:
max
{
0, 1−
σ(1 − β)
λ(1 + σω)
µy
}
< µpi < 1 +
2(1 + β)
λ(1 + σω)
+
σ(1 + β)
λ(1 + σω)
µy. (39)
Now the lower and upper bounds on the inflation response coefficient µpi, given by (38)
and (39), are a function of the output policy response coefficient µy. For the benchmark
parameter values, Figure 2 illustrates the regions of determinacy and indeterminacy for
combinations of µpi and µy under ψ = 0.75, whereas Figure 3 considers the indeterminacy
implications when a lower value for the degree of price stickiness is chosen ψ = 0.50. The
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Figure 2: Determinacy region under a forecast-based inflation and contemporaneous output
rule (ψ = 0.75)
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Figure 3: Determinacy region under a forecast-based inflation and contemporaneous output
rule (ψ = 0.50)
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top, left-hand corners of Figs. 2 and 3 show the determinacy properties of the model un-
der separability of the utility function. When χ = 0, the Taylor principle easily induces
determinacy of equilibrium. By responding to current output, the lower bound on µpi is
reduced below unity and consequently determinacy is also attainable under a passive mon-
etary policy (i.e. µpi < 1). The other three panels of Figs. 2 and 3 show the indeterminacy
implications of real balance effects as the extent of non-separability of the utility function is
increased. The profound impact real balance effects have on the determinacy implications
of the Taylor principle is evident: as χ increases, the lower bound on µpi given in (38)
pivots clockwise around the µpi = 1 point. As prices become more flexible, then the upper
bound on µpi given in (38) additionally shifts anti-clockwise. From inspection of the bottom,
right-hand corner of Fig. 3, the combined effect is a significant reduction in the region of
determinacy.
3.2.2 Policy Response to Expected Future Inflation and Expected Future Out-
put
For completeness, we now examine the policy response to expected future output. This
specification of the interest rate rule is commonly considered in the determinacy literature
(see, e.g., Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Llosa and Tuesta, 2008; Duffy and Xiao, 2011).
Proposition 3 If the policy rule reacts to expected future inflation and expected future
output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium
determinacy in a closed economy are:
max{0,Γ31} < µpi < min{Γ
3
2,Γ
3
3} (40)
where Γ3i , i = 1, 2, 3, are given in Appendix C.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that with χ = 0, the bound Γ33 no longer applies and the determinacy conditions
summarized in Proposition 3 collapse to:
max
{
0, 1−
σ(1 − β)
λ(1 + σω)
µy
}
< µpi < 1 +
2(1 + β)
λ(1 + σω)
−
σ(1 + β)
λ(1 + σω)
µy. (41)
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Figure 4: Determinacy region under a forecast-based inflation and output rule (ψ = 0.75)
A policy rule that also reacts to expected future output greatly increases the range of
indeterminacy under the Taylor principle. For the benchmark parameterization with ψ =
0.75, Figure 4 illustrates the regions of determinacy and indeterminacy for combinations of
µpi and µy for alternative values of χ = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03. The top, left-hand corner of Fig.
4 shows the determinacy properties of the model under separability of the utility function,
and the other three panels show the implications for determinacy as the degree of non-
separability of the utility function is increased. By inspection of Fig. 4, indeterminacy is
generated if the monetary authority is overly aggressive in its setting of the output response
coefficient. Indeed, for high enough values of µy equilibrium determinacy is impossible
regardless of the value of µpi. As Fig. 4 shows, not only is the upper bound on µpi decreasing
with respect to both χ and µy, but in the presence of real balance effects, such a feedback rule
is unlikely to render the equilibrium determinant. For instance, with χ = 0.03 determinacy
is impossible for all µpi if µy ≥ 0.08. The sensitivity analysis suggests that the region of
determinacy further decreases as prices become less sticky. For example, for ψ = 0.50
determinacy is impossible under χ = 0.03 if µy ≥ 0.016.
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What is the intuition behind these results? First note that the upper bounds Γ2i , i =
2, 3, 4, given in Proposition 2 are a combination of the upper bounds Γ1j , j = 1, 2, 3, given
in Proposition 1 for the strict inflation forecast targeting rule, plus the additional margin
now generated by also reacting to current output. This helps reduce the indeterminacy
problem, since in response to a rise in the real interest rate, current output falls, which
helps to offset the upward pressure on marginal cost generated via the cost channel of
monetary policy. Conversely, if forward-looking output enters into the policy rule then this
strengthens the cost channel by increasing the upward-pressure on expected future marginal
cost making indeterminacy more likely. However, when the policy rule also reacts to either
current or future output the Taylor principle is violated in the presence of real balance
effects. To see this, first rearrange the lower bound given in either (39) or (41) as: µpi +
σ(1−β)
λ(1+σω)µy > 1, which as discussed by Woodford (2003a) is the long-run version of the Taylor
principle i.e. each percentage point of permanently higher inflation implies a permanent
increase in output of σ(1−β)
λ(1+σω) percentage points. Hence, in the absence of real balance effects
setting µpi > 1 easily prevents indeterminacy. With real balance effects, rearranging the
(empirically relevant) lower-bound Γ21(= Γ
3
1) < µpi yields: µpi +
σ(1−β−ληRχ)
λ(Ω+σω) µy > 1. Under
the benchmark parameterization, 1 − β − ληRχ < 0 implying that permanently higher
inflation reduces output. Thus, reacting to either current or future output in the policy rule
reduces the magnitude of adjustments in the nominal interest rate to changes in inflation.
Consequently, µpi > 1 no longer guarantees determinacy and the monetary authority has to
be more aggressive than the Taylor principle.
4 Determinacy Analysis for Open Economies
This section considers the issue of local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium
for the open economy. We wish to answer the following question: Do the determinacy
conditions for open economies differ from the conditions for closed economies in the presence
of real balance effects? We restrict our focus to feedback rules that react to expected future
(domestic or consumer-price) inflation and current output (i.e. k = 0 in (34)), since this
has most empirical relevance.
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4.1 Reacting to Expected Domestic-Price Inflation
Let us first consider the determinacy conditions for the open economy when the feedback
rule reacts to expected future domestic-price inflation.
Proposition 4 If the policy rule reacts to expected future domestic-price inflation and con-
temporaneous output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for
local equilibrium determinacy in an open economy are:
max{0,Γ21,Γ
4
1} < µpi < min{Γ
2
3,Γ
2
4,Γ
4
3} or max{0,Γ
2
1,Γ
4
1,Γ
2
3} < µpi < min{Γ
2
2,Γ
4
2,Γ
2
4,Γ
4
3}
(42)
where Γ2i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are defined in Proposition 2, Γ
4
j , j = 2, 3, are given in Appendix D,
and
Γ41 ≡ 1−
[
(1− β)
[
σ(2a− 1)2 +Ω4aθ(1− a)
]
− λσηRχ(2a− 1)
]
λσω(2a− 1)2 +Ωλ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)]
µy.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Under domestic-price inflation targeting, whether indeterminacy is a relatively more serious
problem in open economies than closed economies depends on the magnitude of the lower
and upper bounds on µpi given in (42). For the benchmark parameterization, the numerical
analysis suggests that Γ22 < Γ
4
2 and Γ
2
4 < Γ
4
3, implying that there is no change in relation to
the upper bounds on µpi. Therefore, indeterminacy can only be greater in the open economy
if the additional lower bound Γ41 > Γ
2
1. Figure 5 illustrates the regions of determinacy and
indeterminacy under ψ = 0.75 for combinations of µpi and µy for a low degree of trade
openness (a = 0.85) and a high degree of trade openness (a = 0.6).24 The top, left-
hand corner of Fig. 5 shows the determinacy properties of the model under separability of
the utility function, where the bold line depicts the closed economy case for comparative
purposes. When χ = 0, increases in the degree of trade openness pivot the lower bound
clockwise around the µpi = 1 point, thereby increasing the range of indeterminacy. This
corresponds with the standard conclusion in the open-economy literature: as the degree
of openness to international trade increases, the range of indeterminacy increases (e.g. De
Fiore and Liu, 2005). Consequently, the more open the economy, the greater the response
24The sensitivity analysis suggests that the following conclusions are robust to variations in the degree of
price stickiness.
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Figure 5: Determinacy region under a domestic-price inflation rule (ψ = 0.75): a = 0.85
(—) vs. a = 0.6 (- - -)
to output is needed by the monetary authority.25 The remaining three panels of Fig. 5 show
the indeterminacy implications as the degree of non-separability of the utility function is
increased χ = 0.01, 0.02, 0.03. By inspection, in the presence of real balance effects, the
lower bound Γ41 is now decreasing with respect to the degree of trade openness. Indeed,
with a = 0.6, Γ41 < Γ
2
1 and thus the determinacy conditions for closed and open economies
are identical. Rearranging the lower-bound Γ41 < µpi yields:
µpi +
(1 − β)
[
σ(2a− 1)2 +Ω4aθ(1− a)
]
− λσηRχ(2a− 1)
λσω(2a− 1)2 +Ωλ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)]
µy > 1.
Since under the benchmark parameterization (1−β)
[
σ(2a− 1)2 +Ω4aθ(1− a)
]
−λσηRχ(2a−
1) < 0, as the degree of trade openness is increased (i.e. ↓ a) this reduces the amount output
falls in response to a permanent increase in inflation. Intuitively, when χ > 0 activating the
cost channel of monetary policy, production spillover effects between the two countries are
25This arises because in the benchmark parameterization σ > θ, so that home and foreign bundles are
complements in the utility function, which implies positively correlated production spillover effects between
the two countries following terms of trade changes. Therefore, output fluctuations result in a greater change
in domestic-price inflation, as the degree of trade openness increases.
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now negatively correlated in response to terms of trade adjustments. Thus, as the degree
of trade openness increases, output fluctuations result in lower changes in domestic-price
inflation, thereby reducing the output response needed by the monetary authority.
4.2 Reacting to Expected Consumer-Price Inflation
We now consider the determinacy implications when the feedback rule reacts to expected
future consumer-price inflation. As discussed earlier, there is sizable evidence that headline
CPI is the actual indicator of inflation used by central banks in the setting of monetary
policy (see, e.g. De Fiore and Liu, 2005; Hammond, 2012).
Proposition 5 If the policy rule reacts to expected future consumer price inflation and
contemporaneous output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for local equilibrium determinacy in an open economy are:
max{0,Γ21,Γ
5
1} < µpi < min{Γ
2
3,Γ
5
3,Γ
2
4,Γ
5
4} or
max{0,Γ21,Γ
5
1,Γ
2
3,Γ
5
3} < µpi < min{Γ
2
2,Γ
5
2,Γ
2
4,Γ
5
4} (43)
where Γ2i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are defined in Proposition 2 and Γ
5
j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, are given in
Appendix E.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In order to gain some further insight, we illustrate condition (43) using the benchmark
parameter values summarized in Table 2. Figure 6 shows the regions of determinacy and
indeterminacy for combinations of µpi and µy for alternative values of χ = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
when a = 0.85, whereas Figure 7 considers the indeterminacy implications under a higher
degree of trade openness a = 0.60. The top, left-hand corner of Figs. 6 and 7 show
the determinacy properties of the model under separability of the utility function. When
χ = 0, and in stark contrast to the closed economy, equilibrium determinacy is no longer
guaranteed under the Taylor principle. Now the upper bound on µpi decreases as both the
output response coefficient and the degree of trade openness are increased. The other three
panels of Figs. 6 and 7 show the indeterminacy implications as the degree of non-separability
is increased. By inspection, as χ increases, the lower bound on the inflation
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response coefficient pivots clockwise around the µpi = 1 point, whereas the upper bound
pivots in an anti-clockwise direction. Compared with the closed economy (see Figs. 2
and 3), the range of indeterminacy is clearly higher for open economies, and increases
significantly as the degree of trade openness and non-separability of the utility function are
both increased.26
To get some intuition behind this result, first note that in an open economy the ex-
pected consumer-price inflation rate depends on both the rate of expected domestic-price
inflation and expected changes in the terms of trade: Et{pi
R
t+1} = Et{pi
H−F∗
t+1 } + 2(1 −
a)
(
Et{T̂t+1} − T̂t
)
. Since an increase in the real interest rate results in a current improve-
ment in the terms of trade (T̂t ↓), even in the absence of real balance effects, indeterminacy
can arise provided the upward pressure on consumer-price inflation, generated by the ad-
justments in the terms of trade, is sufficiently strong to offset the reduction in domestic-price
inflation, generated via the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy. As the degree
of trade openness determines the weight of influence of terms of trade adjustments on
consumer-price inflation, the higher the degree of trade openness (↓ a), the more prone is
the economy to indeterminacy. With real balance effects, the indeterminacy problem is ex-
acerbated in two ways. First, because of the cost channel of monetary policy, the downward
pressure exerted on domestic-price inflation via the aggregate demand channel is lower.
Secondly, the greater the degree of non-separability (i.e. ↑ χ), the larger the improvement
in the terms of trade in response to real interest rate rises.
4.3 Reacting to the Real Exchange Rate
There have been recent debates in the literature on whether central banks in open economies
need to additionally respond to the real exchange rate (e.g. Taylor, 2001; Kirsanova et al.,
2006; Bergin et al., 2007; Benigno and Benigno, 2008). For studies that ignore the demand
for money, Linnemann and Schabert (2006), Llosa and Tuesta (2008), andMcKnight (2011a)
have shown that indeterminacy can be reduced if the central bank places a small weight
on its real exchange rate response coefficient. Following this literature, we next study
26The numerical analysis suggests that, for the baseline parameter values, the (empirically relevant) lower
bound is higher in the open economy (Γ21 < Γ
5
1) and the (empirically relevant) upper bound is lower
(Γ54 < Γ
2
4) when a = 0.85. For a higher degree of trade openness a = 0.60, the numerical analysis suggests
that the lower bound on µpi is the same as in the closed economy (since Γ51 < Γ
2
1) but the upper bound is
now significantly lower (Γ54 < Γ
2
4).
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whether incorporating the real exchange rate into the policy rule can help ameliorate the
indeterminacy problem previously identified with real balance effects. Consider the following
log-linearized feedback rule:
R̂t = µpiEtpit+1 + µyŶt + µqQ̂t, (44)
where µpi, µy, µq ≥ 0.
27 We simply report some numerical results for the case of (44). Figure
8 plots the regions of determinacy and indeterminacy for a = 0.6, ψ = 0.75, and χ = 0.03
for four values of the real exchange rate coefficient µq = 0, 0.3, 0.6, 1.0. The top, left-hand
corner of Fig. 8 shows the determinacy properties of the model when µq = 0. Fig. 8
illustrates that reacting positively to the real exchange rate has a very marginal impact
on the regions of (in)determinacy.28 The numerical analysis suggests that there is only a
minimal increase in the upper bound on µpi for determinacy (and no effect on the lower
bound). Even when the interest rate reacts one for one to real exchange rate movements
(µq = 1), the large regions of indeterminacy robustly persist in the presence of real balance
27For the foreign country’s rule, the response coefficient of the real exchange rate is the negative of that for
the home country.
28The sensitivity analysis indicates that this conclusion is robust to variations in χ, ψ, or a.
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effects. Thus, the indeterminacy problems associated with real balance effects cannot be
mitigated by extending the interest rate rule to include the real exchange rate.
4.4 Ameliorating the Indeterminacy Problem
In this subsection we offer two possible solutions to the indeterminacy problem that arises
in the presence of real balance effects in both closed and open economies. It has been
well-established in the determinacy literature that interest-rate rules that introduce history
dependence (or inertia) via the inclusion of lagged endogenous variables can help to deliver
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium (see, e.g., Walsh, 2003; Woodford,
2003b; Bullard and Mitra, 2007). We first introduce policy history dependence by analyzing
a speed-limit rule of the type originally proposed by Walsh (2003):
R̂t = µpiEtpit+1 + µy
(
Ŷt − Ŷt−1
)
, (45)
where µpi, µy ≥ 0. Now the policy rule (45) responds to the observed rate of change of
output, rather than to its level as in (34).29 Figure 9 plots the regions of determinacy
and indeterminacy under the benchmark parameterization for χ = 0.03 and ψ = 0.5. The
top panels of Fig. 9 show the determinacy properties for the closed economy, and the
bottom panels depict the determinacy properties for the open economy with a degree of
trade openness a = 0.6. In both cases, we show the indeterminacy implications if the policy
reacts to contemporaneous output (the left-hand side panels) and if the policy rule reacts
to output growth (the right-hand side panels). By inspection, for both closed and open
economies, the speed-limit policy rule rotates the lower bound on the inflation response
coefficient anti-clockwise until µpi = 1. This suggests that the speed-limit rule restores the
Taylor principle as a necessary condition for determinacy. In terms of the upper bound on
the inflation response coefficient, the speed-limit policy rule rotates the upper bound in a
clockwise direction. While the upper bound can still bind for sufficiently low values of µy,
resulting in indeterminacy, the cost-channel of monetary policy is significantly weakened
29Output growth, in the context of optimal targeting rules, has been shown to be an important component
of the optimal policy. For closed economies, Giannoni and Woodford (2005) show for a variety of envi-
ronments that optimal policy can be formulated as a linear relation between inflation and the change in
the output gap. In an open-economy context, Benigno and Benigno (2006) find that the optimal targeting
rule for cooperating policymakers also involves domestic output (gap) growth, as well as domestic-price and
consumer-price inflation rates.
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with such history dependence in the policy rule. Therefore, by responding to the growth rate
of output in the policy rule, the monetary authority can significantly reduce the possibility of
real balance effects generating indeterminacy. Intuitively, the speed-limit rule is a potential
remedy to the indeterminacy problem since the feedback from the growth rate of remedy
to the indeterminacy problem since the feedback from the growth rate of output further
weakens the cost channel of monetary policy. Moreover, it strengthens the magnitude of
the nominal interest rate response to changes in inflation such that the Taylor principle is
restored.
A policy of interest-rate smoothing can also be successful in reducing indeterminacy.
For instance, consider the following instrument rule:
R̂t = νR̂t−1 + (1− ν)
(
µpiEtpit+1 + µyŶt
)
, (46)
where ν ∈ (0, 1) is the interest-rate smoothing parameter. Figure 10 plots the regions of
determinacy and indeterminacy under the benchmark parameterization for χ = 0.03 and
ψ = 0.5 for two different empirically plausible values of ν = 0.5, 0.8. The top panels of
Fig. 10 show the determinacy properties for the closed economy, and the bottom panels
depict the determinacy properties for the open economy with a degree of trade openness
a = 0.6. By inspection, interest-rate smoothing shifts the upper bound on the inflation
response coefficient outwards. However, while the upper bound is increasing in ν, the lower
bound is not affected.30 Consequently, interest-rate smoothing is particularly effective in
removing indeterminacy for low values of the output response coefficient.
5 Conclusion
In the conduct of monetary policy, central banks nowadays set the nominal interest rate
in response to an inflation forecast. In addition, there is empirical evidence to suggest
that contemporaneous output is also included in the monetary policy rule, since from a
theoretical perspective it contains a useful prediction of future inflationary pressure. The
existing literature has shown that the adoption of such an interest-rate rule can easily
prevent indeterminacy and self-fulfilling fluctuations by implementing the Taylor principle.
30The sensitivity analysis suggests that these conclusions are robust using higher values of ν.
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Yet, these studies have surprisingly ignored the role of money demand in their analysis. Real
balance effects generate an additional monetary transmission channel, whereby changes in
money demand affect inflation via changes in real marginal cost. We have shown that
small, empirically plausible real balance effects can impair sizeably, via this cost channel,
the ability of the Taylor principle to induce equilibrium determinacy.
While our analysis raises some important concerns relating to the ability of central
banks to avoid indeterminacy, through the implementation of commonly used interest rate
rules that respond to expected future inflation, we have outlined a simple and practical
solution: the introduction of policy inertia via either interest rate-smoothing or by replacing
contemporaneous output with output growth. Monetary policy inertia counteracts the
indeterminacy problems that arise from real balance effects helping restore the ability of
the Taylor principle to prevent the emergence of self-fulfilling inflation expectations.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional
system in
[
m̂Wt Ĉ
W
t
]
′
, where the coefficient matrix is:
A1 ≡


σ
[
λ(ω+σ−1)+ βηc
ηRµpi
]
[(µpi−1)+µpiηRχ]−1
µpiηRσχλω−βΩ
ηc−
[
λ(ω+σ−1)+ βηc
ηRµpi
]
[µpiηR+σ(µpi−1)ηc]
µpiηRσχλω−βΩ
σ
(
λχ+ β
ηRµpi
)
[(µpi−1)+µpiηRχ]−σχ
µpiηRσχλω−βΩ
σχηc−
(
λχ+ β
ηRµpi
)
[µpiηR+σ(µpi−1)ηc]
µpiηRσχλω−βΩ

 .
Its determinant and trace are: detA1 =
Ω
βΩ−µpiηRλωσχ
and trA1 = 1 +
(µpi−1)λ(σω+Ω)−Ω
ηRµpiσχλω−βΩ
.
Since m̂W and ĈW are non-predetermined variables, determinacy requires that the two
eigenvalues of A1 are outside the unit circle. According to the Schur-Cohn criterion (see,
e.g., LaSalle, 1986), this requires that (i) |detA1| > 1 and (ii) |trA1| < 1 + detA1. First
note that detA1 > 1 provided µpi < Γ
1
1. In this case, condition (ii) implies that 1 < µpi < Γ
1
3.
Next note that detA1 < −1 provided Γ
1
1 < µpi < Γ
1
2. Then |trA1| < −1 − detA1 implies
1 < µpi < Γ
1
3. This completes the proof. 
B Proof of Proposition 2
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional
system in
[
m̂Wt Ĉ
W
t
]
′
, where the coefficient matrix is:
A2 ≡

 σΛ21 − Λ
2
2
Λ2
1
(
σ(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+ σχ
)
Λ22Λ
2
3
Λ2
1
−
σ(ηC−ηRµy)
Λ2
1
σ2χ
Λ2
1
− (βσ+ληRσχµpi)
Λ2
1
(
σ(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+ σχ
)
Λ23(βσ+ληRσχµpi)
Λ2
1
−
σ2χ(ηC−ηRµy)
Λ2
1

 ,
with Λ21 ≡ βσ(Ω + ηRσχµy) − ληRσ
2ωχµpi, Λ
2
2 ≡ βσ(ηC − ηRµy) + ληRµpi(1 + σω),
Λ23 ≡ 1 + σµy + (µpi − 1)(ηC − ηRµy)
σ
ηRµpi
, detA2 =
Ω+σµy(1+ηRχ)
βΩ+ηRσχ[βµy−λωµpi]
, and trA2 =
1+
Ω−λ(µpi−1)[Ω+σω]+µyσ[ηRχ(1+λ)+β]
βΩ+ηRσχ[βµy−λωµpi ]
. Determinacy again requires that the two eigenvalues
are outside the unit circle. Using the Schur-Cohn criteria, the detA2 > 1 provided µpi < Γ
2
3
and in this case |trA2| < 1 + detA2 implies max
{
0,Γ21
}
< µpi < Γ
2
4, where
Γ23 ≡
βΩ
λσωηRχ
+
β
λω
µy,
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Γ24 ≡
2Ω(1 + β)
λ [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
+
(Ω + σω)
[Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
+
σ [(1 + β)(1 + 2ηRχ) + ληRχ]
λ [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
µy.
Next note that detA2 < −1 provided Γ
2
3 < µpi < Γ
2
2, where
Γ22 ≡
Ω(1 + β)
λσωηRχ
+
σ [1 + ηRχ(1 + β)]
λσωηRχ
µy.
Then |trA2| < −1− detA2 implies max
{
0,Γ21
}
< µpi < Γ
2
4. This completes the proof. 
C Proof of Proposition 3
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following three-dimensional
system in
[
m̂Wt Ĉ
W
t pi
W
t
]
′
, where the coefficient matrix is:
A3 ≡


1 +
λ(σµy−µpi)
βσµy
−
1−σµy
ηRσχµy
ηC(1−σµy)
ηRσχµy
− 1
σχ
−
λ(1+σω)(σµy−µpi)
βσ2χµy
σµy−µpi
βσχµy
− 1
ηRµy
− λχµpi
βµy
ηC
ηRµy
+ λµpi(1+σω)
βσµy
− µpi
βµy
λχ
β
−λ(1+σω)
βσ
1
β

 .
The three eigenvalues of A3 are solutions to the cubic equation r
3 + a2r
2 + a1r + a0 = 0,
where
a2 = −1−
1
β
−
λ(ωµpi + µy)
βµy
−
1
χηR
+
Ω
ηRσχµy
a1 =
1
β
+
λ(µpi − 1) (Ω + σω)
βηRσχµy
+
1
βηRχ
+
λωµpi
βµy
−
(1 + β)Ω
βηRσχµy
a0 =
Ω
βηRσχµy
.
As there are no predetermined variables, determinacy requires that all the eigenvalues are
outside the unit circle. Since a0 > 0, this is the case if and only if the following Schur-Cohn
criterion is satisfied: (i) 1+a2+a1+a0 > 0, (ii) −1+a2−a1+a0 > 0, and (iii) a
2
0−1 >| a0a2−
a1 |. Conditions (i) and (ii) simplify respectively to λ(µpi−1)(Ω+σω)+σµy(1−β−ληRχ) >
0, and 2Ω(1+β)+λ(Ω+σω) > λµpi [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]+σµy [1 + β + ηRχ(λ+ 2(1 + β))],
which imply max{0,Γ31} < µpi < Γ
3
2, where
Γ31 ≡ 1−
σ (1− β − ληRχ)
λ(Ω + σω)
µy, Γ
3
2 ≡
2Ω(1 + β) + λ(Ω + σω)
λ [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
−
σ [(1 + β)(1 + 2ηRχ) + ληRχ]
λ [Ω + σω(1 + 2ηRχ)]
µy.
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For condition (iii), the case 1− a20 < a0a2 − a1 implies µpi < Γ
3
3, where
Γ33 ≡
Ω2(1 + β)
βληRχσµy
[
Ω
(
1 + ω
βµy
)
+ σω(1 + ηRχ)
] − Ω
[
(1 − β)(1 + λ+ β) + β
ηRχ
]
βλ
[
Ω
(
1 + ω
βµy
)
+ σω(1 + ηRχ)
]
+
σω
Ω
(
1 + ω
βµy
)
+ σω(1 + ηRχ)
−
σ[1 + ηRχ(1 + β)]
λ
[
Ω
(
1 + ω
βµy
)
+ σω(1 + ηRχ)
]µy.
For the case a20 − 1 > a0a2 − a1, this can be expressed as:
Ω
β
[
Ω(1− β)
ηRσχµy
+ (1− β)(1 + β + λ) +
λωµpi
µy
+
β
ηRχ
]
+ (1− β)ηRσχµy + ληRσωχµpi + λΩ
+βσµy + ηRλσχµy + [λ(µpi − 1)(Ω + σω) + σµy(1− β − ληRχ)] > 0,
which, by inspection, is always satisfied if condition (i) holds. This completes the proof. 
D Proof of Proposition 4
The difference system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional
system in
[
m̂Rt Ĉ
R
t
]
′
, where the coefficient matrix is:
B ≡

 σΛ
4
1Λ
4
2+Λ
4
3
ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi−βµy ]−βΩ
Λ45−Λ
4
1Λ
4
4
ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi−βµy ]−βΩ
σΛ42Λ
4
6+σχΛ
4
3
ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi−βµy ]−βΩ
σχΛ45−Λ
4
4Λ
4
6
ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi−βµy ]−βΩ

 ,
with Λ41 ≡ βηc−
βηRµy
σ(2a−1)
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
+ ληRµpi
σ(2a−1)
[
1 + σω(2a− 1)2 + 4aθω(1− a)
]
,
Λ42 ≡ χ +
(2a−1)(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+
µy4aθχ(1−a)
µpi
, Λ43 ≡
ηRµy4aθχ(1−a)
2a−1 − 1, Λ
4
4 ≡ 1 +
σηc(2a−1)(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+
µy
µpi
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
, Λ45 ≡ ηc−
ηRµy
σ(2a−1)
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
, Λ46 ≡ β−
βηRµy4aθχ(1−a)
2a−1 +
λχηRµpi
2a−1 [1 + 4aθω(1− a)], detB =
Ω[1+µy4aθ(1−a)]+µyσ(2a−1)[(2a−1)+χηR]
βΩ+(2a−1)χσηR[βµy−λωµpi ]
, and trB = 1 +
Ω−λ(µpi−1)[σω(2a−1)2+Ω[1+4aθω(1−a)]]
βΩ−(2a−1)χσηR[λωµpi−βµy]
+
µy[σηRχ(2a−1)(1+λ)+σβ(2a−1)2+βΩ4aθ(1−a)]
βΩ−(2a−1)χσηR[λωµpi−βµy ]
. Determi-
nacy again requires that the two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle. Using the Schur-
Cohn conditions, detB > 1 provided µpi <
βΩ+(2a−1)βχηRσµy
ηRχσωλ(2a−1)
≡ Γ44 and in this case
38
|trB| < 1 + detB implies max{0,Γ41} < µpi < Γ
4
3, where
Γ43 ≡
2Ω(1 + β) + λσω(2a− 1)2 + λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)]
λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)] + λσω(2a− 1)[2a− 1 + 2ηRχ]
+
[
(1 + β)[Ω4aθ(1 − a) + σ(2a− 1)2] + σηRχ(2a− 1)[λ+ 2(1 + β)]
]
λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)] + λσω(2a− 1)[2a− 1 + 2ηRχ]
µy.
Next note that detB < −1 provided Γ44 < µpi < Γ
4
2, where
Γ42 ≡
Ω(1 + β)
λσωηRχ(2a− 1)
+
[
σ(2a− 1)2 +Ω4aθ(1− a) + (2a− 1)σηRχ(1 + β)
]
(2a− 1)λσωηRχ
µy.
Then |trB| < −1 − detB implies Γ41 < µpi < Γ
4
3. Therefore, max{0,Γ
4
1} < µpi < Γ
4
3,
and either µpi < Γ
4
4 or Γ
4
4 < µpi < Γ
4
2, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
difference system. Comparing these bounds on µpi with the determinacy conditions obtained
for the aggregate system given in Proposition 2, it is straightforward to verify that Γ21 ≶ Γ
4
1,
Γ22 ≶ Γ
4
2, Γ
2
3 < Γ
4
4, and Γ
2
4 ≶ Γ
4
3. This completes the proof. 
E Proof of Proposition 5
The difference system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional
system in
[
m̂Rt Ĉ
R
t
]
′
, where the coefficient matrix is:
C ≡

 −σΛ
5
1Λ
5
2−Λ
5
3
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy]
Λ51Λ
5
4−Λ
5
5
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy ]
−σΛ52Λ
5
6−σχΛ
5
3
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy]
Λ54Λ
5
6−σχΛ
5
5
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy ]

 ,
with Λ51 ≡ βηc[1−2(1−a)µpi]−
βηRµy
σ(2a−1)
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
+ληRµpi
σ
[
1 + σω(2a− 1)2 + 4aθω(1− a)
]
,
Λ52 ≡ χ+
(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+
µy4aθχ(1−a)
µpi(2a−1)
, Λ53 ≡
ηRµy4aθχ(1−a)
2a−1 − [1− 2(1− a)µpi], Λ
5
4 ≡ 1+
σηc(µpi−1)
ηRµpi
+
µy
µpi(2a−1)
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
, Λ55 ≡ ηc[1−2(1−a)µpi]−
ηRµy
σ(2a−1)
[
4aθ(1− a) + σ(2a− 1)2
]
,
Λ56 ≡ β[1− 2(1− a)µpi]−
βηRµy4aθχ(1−a)
2a−1 + λχηRµpi [1 + 4aθω(1− a)],
detC =
Ω[1−2(1−a)µpi ]+µy [4aθ(1−a)Ω+(2a−1)χηRσ+σ(2a−1)
2 ]
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy ]
, and
trC = 1+
Ω[1−2(1−a)µpi]−λ(µpi−1)[σω(2a−1)2+Ω[1+4aθω(1−a)]]
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi ]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy ]
+
µy[σηRχ(2a−1)(1+λ)+σβ(2a−1)2+βΩ4aθ(1−a)]
βΩ[1−2(1−a)µpi]−ηRσχ(2a−1)[λωµpi(2a−1)−βµy]
.
Determinacy again requires that the two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle. Using the
Schur-Cohn conditions, detC > 1 provided µpi < Γ
5
3 and in this case |trC| < 1 + detC
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implies max{0,Γ51} < µpi < Γ
5
4, where
Γ51 ≡ 1−
[
(1− β)
[
σ(2a− 1)2 +Ω4aθ(1− a)
]
− λσηRχ(2a− 1)
]
λσω(2a− 1)2 +Ωλ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)]
µy,
Γ53 ≡
βΩ + βσηRχ(2a− 1)µy
2βΩ(1− a) + λσωηRχ(2a− 1)2
,
Γ54 ≡
2Ω(1 + β) + λσω(2a− 1)2 + λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)]
4Ω(1− a)(1 + β) + λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)] + λσω(2a− 1)2(1 + 2ηRχ)
+
[
(1 + β)[Ω4aθ(1 − a) + σ(2a− 1)2] + σηRχ(2a− 1)[λ+ 2(1 + β)]
]
4Ω(1− a)(1 + β) + λΩ[1 + 4aθω(1− a)] + λσω(2a− 1)2(1 + 2ηRχ)
µy.
Next note that detC < −1 provided Γ53 < µpi < Γ
5
2, where
Γ52 ≡
Ω(1 + β) +
[
σηRχ(2a− 1)(1 + β) +
[
σ(2a− 1)2 + 4aθΩ(1− a)
]]
µy
2Ω(1− a)(1 + β) + λσωηRχ(2a− 1)2
.
Then |trC| < −1 − detC implies Γ51 < µpi < Γ
5
4. Therefore, max{0,Γ
5
1} < µpi < Γ
5
4,
and either µpi < Γ
5
3 or Γ
5
3 < µpi < Γ
5
2, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
difference system. This completes the proof. 
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